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Abstract: This work studies the determinants of the sovereign CDS-bond basis 
distortions, in the Euro area, during the last crises period.  
Regression analysis showed four relevant conclusions. Credit rating and credit outlook 
downgrades have a huge impact on the sovereign credit instruments premiums, although 
not originating arbitrage opportunities. Moreover, the ECB rate has a smoother effect on 
the sovereign debt markets’ functioning and the risk-transfer balance between the state 
and the financial sector seems to have shifted from one crisis period to the other. 
Finally, markets’ liquidity is the most powerful force in driving arbitrage opportunities 
in the sovereign debt market. 
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1. Introduction 
The crisis started in the US with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, in 2007. 
The uncertainty about the dimension and value of securities collateralized by those 
subprime mortgages spread uncertainty and banks stopped lending to each other. 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, in September 2008, resulted in the seizing up of 
interbank lending, on panic that no bank was safe anymore. In early October, the results 
were spread to Europe and the Emerging countries and the world witnessed a large-
scale state support for banks
1
.  
In the first half of 2010, Eurozone sovereign debt markets were under an unprecedented 
stress and, eventually, some of the peripheral economies started having difficulties to re-
finance their debt. As a consequence, Greece (May, 2010), Ireland (November, 2011) 
and Portugal (April, 2011) had to receive help from the International Monetary Fund 
and the Eurozone members to avoid defaulting on their massive debt
2
. 
The traditional view of developed economies sovereign debt instruments as risk-free 
assets gave place to a major repricing and re-assessment of their risk. There was a flight 
to safety phenomenon which originated heterogenic changes in the liquidity of debt 
instruments’ markets across countries, such as liquidity shortages in the case of 
Portugal, Ireland or Greece. Rating Agencies increased heavily their activity in the Euro 
area (51 credit rating downgrades since 2009)
3
. The ECB made use of its instruments 
and decreased its official rate from 4,25% in July, 2008 to 1% in May, 2009. In 
addition, it started the so-called Securities Market Programme, which comprises the 
institution’s intervention in the sovereign bond markets, although limited to a weekly 
                                                             
1
 The states’ fiscal deficit got back to values last seen after the World War II, also fostered by other economic 
stimulus that overloaded the public sector.  
2
 A more complete narrative of the crises can be found in Appendix 1 at the Appendices section of this work. 
3 Reductions on the credit quality of their debt make it more difficult and costly for countries to issue new debt, 
eroding even further their financial condition. 
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purchase amount of EUR 20bn, as buying individual countries’ debt can be seen as state 
financing.  
The purpose of this work is to study the sovereign debt markets during the recent period 
of financial and economic distress, through an analysis of the CDS-Bond basis’ 
determinants. The basis is the difference between the spread of the CDS and the spread 
of its underlying bond and, as it should be zero in times of regular market conditions, it 
is a good provider of information regarding sovereign credit markets’ functioning
4
. 
Since the start of the subprime crisis, the sovereign basis of euro area countries have 
reached abnormal values, as it can be observed in Table 1, as well as in Graph 1
5
. It has 
either widened significantly, or became negative, as in the cases of Portugal, Ireland or 
Greece. 
The sample period goes from March, 2007 to October, 2011 and comprises weekly 
observations on the 5 years CDS spreads and bond yields of 8 Euro area countries.  
The first main result is that credit rating and credit outlook do not have a big impact on 
the basis. However, by analyzing separately the basis’ components, one can conclude 
that those factors do cause a massive impact on the sovereign debt markets’ functioning.  
Also, results allow suggesting that the risk-transfer relationship between the state and 
the banking sector has shifted in the later crisis. Moreover, they confirm the stabilizer 
role of the European Central Bank, whose key rates changes have a smoother effect in 
the basis. 
Finally, there is evidence supporting what previous studies have mentioned regarding 
the crucial role of liquidity in setting up the odds in credit market’s functioning. 
                                                             
4
 Nonetheless, being a useful instrument to help making inferences on the debt market’s health, it can also be a 
potential source of profit, when it acquires abnormal values as it has been happening during the crises. 
5 Indeed, the average basis rose by 50 basis points from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period. With the exception of 
Portugal, Ireland and Greece, where the basis became negative at some points in time, all the other countries 
experienced ever high positive values. 
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Section 2 provides a detailed explanation on the CDS-Bond basis and Section 3 gives an 
overview of what has been studied about the subject. Section 4 provides information on 
the data sample and test procedures. Section 5 comprises a detailed analysis of each 
factor used in the research, as well as its main results. Section 6 concludes the work. 
 
2. The CDS-Bond Basis6 
The basis is the difference between the spread of a CDS and the spread of a senior 
fixed-rate bond, for the same underlying issuer and with similar maturity. 
CDS stands for Credit Default Swap and is essentially an over-the-counter insurance 
contract that offers protection against default of a specific reference entity
7
. The 
protection buyer makes periodic premium payments
8
 to the protection seller until 
maturity or until some credit event occurs
9
.  
CDS spreads are directly observed in the market and, traditionally, yield spreads were 
calculated using a risk-free sovereign bond as benchmark, which in this case would be 
German bunds. However, besides the inconvenient of letting Germany outside the 
sample, in the literature is becoming widespread the conviction that swap rates (IRS) are 
the most adequate benchmark to compute this variable. It seems that government bonds 
are less than an ideal proxy for the unobservable risk-free rate due to different taxation 
treatment, repo specials and scarcity premiums. Moreover, the Euro-swap benchmark 
comes with the advantages of being highly liquid and carrying relatively lower 
                                                             
6 A detailed narrative on the subject is provided in Appendix 2 at the Appendices section of this work. 
7 Reference Entity is essentially the party upon which the two counterparties in the transaction are speculating. The 
seller of the transaction is selling protection against the default of the reference entity. The buyer of the securitized 
credit derivative believes that there may be a chance that the reference entity will default upon their issued debt and is 
therefore entering the appropriate position. It can be a corporation, government or other legal entity that issues debt of 
any kind. 
8 The premium paid by the protection buyer to the protection seller, called the “spread”, is quoted in basis points per 
annum of the contract’s notional value and is usually paid quarterly.  
9 A recent document published by ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association) on Greek Sovereign Debt 
(31-10-2011) refers as credit events the following: Failure to Pay Principal or the Coupon when they are due; 
Repudiation/Moratorium and Restructuring. 
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counterparty risk
10
. On the other hand, this method can slightly increase the basis, as 
IRS are normally higher than German yields (this relation can be observed in the 
Germany section of Graph 1). Notwithstanding, in this work the bond spread is 
calculated by subtracting the Euro-swap rate of the correspondent maturity from the 
sovereign par bond yield of each country.   
Under free arbitrage conditions, the basis should be zero (Jan de Wit in 2006 and 
Fontana and Scheicher in 2010), as both sovereign bonds and CDS offer exposure to the 
same sovereign debt and thus, buying a bond or sell protection on it should carry the 
same risk. Historically, however, the basis has been slightly above zero, meaning that 
CDS spreads have consistently overcome bonds’ spreads
11
.  
When the opportunity is exploitable and the basis is positive, the arbitrage strategy on 
this deviation would consist on short-selling the bond, underwriting CDS protection, 
while buying the risk-free rate
12
.  On the other hand, if the basis is negative, the strategy 
would be the opposite: buying the bond and protection against its default, financed at 
the risk-free rate
13
.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
10
 These arguments are supported by Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009), McCauley (2002), Hull, Predescu, and 
White (2004) and Blanco,Brennan, and Marsh (2005). 
11 This evidence is justified by Fontana and Scheicher, who state that bonds are cash instruments and CDS are 
derivative contracts and, as a result, from a trader’s perspective, those are not perfect substitutes. Bond prices are 
affected by interest rate risk, default risk, funding risk and market liquidity risk, while CDS are affected mainly by 
default risk and counterparty risk.  
12
 Palladini and Portes (2011) explain that the rationale behind this trading has to do with the fact that if the credit 
quality on the reference entity improves (and the basis gets narrow) no reimbursement will occur, while the CDS 
seller profits from the stream of premiums payments. 
13
 In this case, the rationale is betting that the basis will increase, or that the credit quality of the reference entity will 
get worse. If a credit event occurs the buyer will receive the compensation, but, even if it doesn’t get to the point of 
default, CDS owned by the buyer will have a higher value, as the probability of default of the reference entity has 
eroded. Thus, the investor can still sell it on the market for a profit, assuming that the market would have enough 
liquidity to absorb it.  
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3. Literature Review 
This study is in line with the 2010’s, Fontana and Scheicher, paper about the Euro area 
sovereign CDS market, which comprises an examination of the basis’ determinants. 
They rely mainly on variables which proxy for investors’ risk appetite and find a 
significant positive impact of the Itraxx Financials 5y CDS index and a significant 
negative impact coming from the Country’s debt relative to GDP.  
Moreover, Carboni and Carboni (2011) and Dieckmann and Plank (2011) state the 
importance of the financial system in this subject. Particularly, the financial sector 
condition has a strong explanatory power on the behavior of CDS spreads (influencing 
the basis), and the magnitude of that impact is related to what was the country’s 
financial exposure before the crisis. 
Palladini and Portes (2011), through their study on the price discovery relationship 
between the two basis’ components of six Euro area countries, conclude that in the long 
run there is an equilibrium relationship between these two variables, which make them 
converge. However, in the short run, they find that cash and synthetic markets price 
credit risk differently to various degrees. This short term deviations persist longer than 
it would take for investors in one market to observe the price in the other, confirming 
the hypothesis of existent arbitrage opportunities in the relationship between the two 
instruments. Afterwards, through a VECM
14
 analysis and a Granger causality test
15
, 
they conclude that CDS market moves ahead of the bond market in terms of price 
discovery.  
Previously, in 2006, Jan De Wit conducts a comprehensive analysis of the CDS-Bond 
Basis, which provides information regarding determinants that normally influence the 
basis, in a pure way (pre-crisis results). He mentions as drivers for a positive basis the 
                                                             
14
 A Vector Error Correction Model can lead to a better understanding of the nature of any nonstationarity among the 
different component series and can also improve longer term forecasting over an unconstrained model. 
15 Statistical Hypothesis test for determining whether one time series is useful in forecasting another.  
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CDS cheapest to deliver option
16
, bonds trading below par, the fact that CDS premiums 
are floored at zero and the difficulty in shorting cash-bonds; as for drivers of negative 
basis, he mentions counterparty default risk, which is more evident on a CDS contract, 
or bonds trading above par. Finally, he mentions as either influencing negatively or 
positively the basis, the relative liquidity in each segment market and coupon’ 
specificities.  
Picking up on the liquidity factor, during my research I also rely on Beber, Brandt and 
Kavajecz (2008) study on the flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity phenomenon. They 
state that investors do demand both credit quality and liquidity, but at different times 
and for different reasons. They explain that the size of sovereign yield spreads is 
explained by differences in credit quality. However, the destination of large flows into 
or out of the market is determined by liquidity and, in times of market stress, investors 
pursue liquidity, not credit quality. 
Finally, Miles Weiss (December, 2011), a reporter at Bloomberg, writes about the 
riskiness associated with the credit swaps on European sovereign debt, mentioning two 
main sources of troubles: European leaders have been avoiding payout triggers, by 
preventing for instance the Greek bailout to be classified as a credit event (which would 
trigger a payout to CDS holders); and second, the strong possibility that banks, which 
wrote massive amounts in credit swaps on sovereign debt
17
, would not be able to meet 
their obligations if a country such as Greece would actually default.  
The idea of this work is to add on the investigation about the determinants of the basis’ 
deviations from the parity condition, by adding new explanatory factors and by 
leveraging on previously used factors and findings, which can help to interpret the 
present results. 
                                                             
16
 In case of default of the reference entity the protection buyer is free to choose from a basket of eligible bonds. 
17 Banking regulation defines sovereign credits as risk free, allowing banks to take sovereign-credit risk without 
having to set aside any capital. 
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4. Test Procedures 
4.1. Data Set 
This study examines the overall 5years Sovereign CDS-Bond basis’ drivers of 8 Euro 
area countries: Portugal, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Greece
18
. 
The data
19
 was available at the Bloomberg terminal and comprise the period that goes 
from the 7
th
 of March, 2007 to the 5
th
 of October, 2011. Weekly data is used, more 
specifically, Wednesdays’ values. 
 
4.2. Methodology 
The data sample comprises heterogeneities across periods and countries. Therefore, the 
work encloses separate panel regressions to deal with the first issue:  period I (subprime 
crisis) goes from the 7
th
 of March, 2007 to the 31
st
 of December, 2008; period II 
(sovereign debt crisis) ranges between the 7
th
 of January, 2009 and the 5
th
 of October, 
2011. To assess the second issue, there are separate regressions comprising either the 
whole group of countries, the bailed out countries separately from the remaining; or the 
southern European countries versus the central European ones. Moreover, to take a step 
further in understanding the factors’ scope of impact, separate regressions using only 
the Bond Spread or the CDS Spread as dependent variables, were estimated.  
Due to the presence of near multicollinearity
20
 among explanatory variables, multiple 
regressions cannot be estimated
21
. Therefore, individual regressions of the form of (A), 
(B) or (C) are estimated for each explanatory variable. This way I intend to conclude, 
through the values of the r-squares and the sign and significance level of the 
                                                             
18 Countries like Ireland or the Netherlands had to be totally or partly left out of the analysis due to data availability 
constraints. 
19 CDS spreads, bond yields, Euribor rates, Credit Rating news, Credit outlook news, ECB key rate, EURO STOXX 
Banks Index and the CDS and Bonds’ BidAsk spreads. 
20
 Non-negligible relationship between two or more explanatory variables, which causes distortions in the outcome of 
the regression. 
21 A detailed explanation on this subject is provided in Appendix 3 at the Appendices section of this work. 
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coefficients, the magnitude of their impact on the dependent variable. The results are 
presented following a detailed explanation of each explanatory variable and the 
hypothesis lying behind its usage. 
                                       (A), 
                                            (B) 
                                           (C) 
Where “i” stands for country (some explanatory variables are the same for every 
country and therefore the “i” does not apply) and “t” stands for time. Basis is the 
difference between the CDS spread and the Bond spread of each country at a particular 
day (Wednesdays) and Explanatory variable is the representation of the explanatory 
variables used in this work. 
 
5. Basis Determinants & Empirical Results  
5.1. Credit Rating
22
 
There are three top credit rating agencies that predominantly influence investors’ 
decisions and expectations regarding either companies’ value or governments’ 
credibility: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch
23
.  
The Eurozone countries’ credit ratings had been predominantly stable until the 
beginning of the sovereign debt crisis, when some of the so-called peripheral countries 
started seeing their debt rating classification eroding. In the last 3 years, Standard & 
Poor’s effectuated 19 credit rating changes, Moody’s contributed with 17 and Fitch with 
15, which totals 51 credit rating changes in the Euro area. The abundant and abnormally 
quick rating downgrades have been making more difficult and costly for countries to re-
                                                             
22 According to Standard&Poor’s, credit ratings are forward-looking opinions about credit risk. They express the 
agencies’ opinions regarding the ability and willingness of an issuer, such as a corporation, a city government or a 
state, to meet its financial obligations in full and on time. 
23 Details about the three agencies and their rating classification scales are shown in Appendix 4 at the Appendices 
section of this work. 
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finance, which intensifies the problem, by eroding countries credibility even further. 
Moreover, Gande and Parsley (2003) found evidences of spillover effects, which mean 
that a rating change in one country has a significant effect on sovereign credit spreads of 
other countries. 
Finally, by not sticking to only one of the three agencies’ classifications
24
, I am able to 
capture all the significant rating activity that has been going on in the markets. 
Hypothesis 1.1: It is expected that unforeseen ratings’ downgrade activity has a 
significant, and negative, impact on sovereign credit markets functioning i.e. the basis. 
Hypothesis 1.2: As Eurozone countries are related in so many dimensions, it is expected 
that the overall activity relative to the credit rating of a certain country does have a 
significant impact in the remaining Eurozone countries under analysis.  
I estimated the baseline regressions (A), (B) and (C) using each of the three agencies 
credit rating history. Those agencies attribute classification to the credit quality of 
sovereign debt instruments through an alphabetical scale, which vary from agency to 
agency. In order to make that scale regression-friendly I converted it into a numerical 
one, as Ferreira and Gama (2007) do and as is expressed in Table 2. This numerical 
coding goes from 0 to 20, where 20 represent the maximum classification (AAA in the 
case of Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, and Aaa in the case of Moody’s).  
The results show that credit rating changes do not have a big impact on the basis – the r-
squares of these regressions never go beyond 3%, as can be seen in Table 3. However, 
the credit rating changes do have a massive impact on the sovereign debt instruments. 
When looking separately at the spreads (Tables 4 and 5), it becomes clear the impact of 
this variable in the premiums: the r-squares range between 50 and 85% and the 
coefficients are significant and negative. Moreover, both the coefficients and the r-
squares acquire very high values in period II (i.e. S&P coefficient goes from -6 in 
                                                             
24 Ferreira and Gama (2006) and Gande and Parsley (2003) focus only on Standard & Poor’s announcements. 
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period I to -70 in period II, when the bond spread is the dependent variable), which 
means that the higher the downgrade activity, the higher the impact in the premiums.  
As bond and CDS spreads’ move together (coefficients are very similar), the impact of 
this factor cannot be perceived by examining the basis alone
25
.  
Arbitrage opportunities may surge when the impact on the CDS spread is significantly 
higher than the impact on the bond spread. This seems to be happening in Portugal and 
Greece, during period II. Table 6 shows that the basis does suffer a higher impact from 
credit rating reductions in this particular case (R-squares between 8 and 21%, and 
coefficients ranging between -13 and -22).  
Results seem to refute hypothesis 1.2: Other countries rating changes appear to not have 
a significant effect in the basis neither on the spreads. Instead of using the own country 
numerical scale, I estimated regression (A) using the sum of all rating changes 
(numerical scale) at every given week, with exception of the country itself. 
 
5.2.Credit Outlook 
Other instrument that Rating Agencies often use is the credit outlook
26
. It provides 
investors with information on the potential evolution of a rating; hence, it increases its 
precision
27
.  
Hypothesis 2: Following the same rationale as for credit rating announcements, it is 
expected that credit outlooks originate a significant impact on the CDS-bond basis 
misalignment (negative outlooks will widen the basis), both in the country and on the 
other countries’ basis. 
                                                             
25 A detailed analysis on the rating change days is presented in Appendix 5 at the Appendices section of this work. 
26 According to the Financial Times Lexicon a credit or rating outlook indicates the potential direction of a rating 
over the intermediate term, typically six months to two years. 
27
Gande and Parsley (2003) in their work regarding News Spillovers in the Sovereign Debt Market and Ferreira and 
Gama (2006) through their study about the sovereign debt rating news spillover to international stock markets, recall 
the importance of not missing the information embedded in credit outlooks.  
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Similarly to what have been done with the ratings’ scale, I also used numerical coding 
to represent credit outlook news releases
28
. As the goal is to capture the overall credit 
outlook activity, I did not differentiate between the originators of the news (i.e. 
agencies); their outcomes are considered together as an explanatory variable for the 
CDS-bond basis behavior. I estimated this impact through regression (A), (B) and (C). 
In addition, as there are no credit outlook releases during period I, the analysis relies 
only on period II data. 
Similarly to the credit rating announcements, credit outlook changes have a significant 
and negative impact on the CDS and bond spreads, as observable in Tables 4 and 5 (r-
squares of 60 and 69%), although this effect is hidden when looking solely at the basis 
(the coefficient is not significant).  
The main difference relies on the effect of other Eurozone countries credit outlook 
changes, which is significant and negative, although not having a powerful explanatory 
capacity (r-square of 4%, as shown in table 5), which suggests that the surprise effect 
embedded in a credit outlook change is higher. 
 
5.3.Liquidity
29
  
Even though we have been living times of global financial markets integration, blurring 
of frontiers, and witnessing an increasing number of arbitrageurs who are technically 
able to exploit price discrepancies, the crises have been causing significant disruptions 
in markets’ liquidity (materialized in flight to safe German bunds or sell-off of 
peripheral countries debt, for instance), which have been inducing significant changes in 
the debt instruments’ premiums. 
                                                             
28
 For instance, to a negative outlook announcement is associated -1, to a positive announcement, 1, to a positive 
credit watch 0,5 and to a negative credit watch -0,5 (the numbers change in the day of the announcement and 
thereafter assume that new value). 
29 Jan De Wit (2006), Fontana and Scheicher (2010), Tang and Yan (2007) and Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2008), 
among several other authors, mention the importance of relative markets’ liquidity in the definition of the overall 
basis value and in the CDS spread in particular. 
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Hypothesis 3.1: It is expected that diminished activity in the CDS and bond markets i.e. 
lower liquidity, to cause an increase in both the CDS and the bond spreads. 
Hypothesis 3.2: It is expected that uncertainty and fear inherent to a crisis to induce 
higher disruptions in the CDS market than in the bonds’, causing an impact in the basis 
explained by liquidity changes
30
. 
As a proxy for the instrument’s liquidity, which I used as explanatory variable in 
regressions (A), (B) and (C), I am using their bid-ask spreads. These spreads are the 
difference in price between the highest price that a buyer is willing to pay for an asset 
and the lowest price for which a seller is willing to sell it
31
. The higher the bid-ask 
spread, the lower the liquidity in the market and the higher the risk premium
32
. 
The results show 2 main findings that support the above hypotheses: first, the 
coefficients and the r-squares for both the explanatory variables in both periods are 
higher when the CDS spread is the dependent variable, instead of the bond’s spread
33
 
(this can be observed in Tables 4 and 5), justifying the positive and powerful effect on 
the basis that can be observed in Table 3; second, it is clear, particularly during period 
II, that the impact of liquidity is much higher in the Southern countries’ basis (as can be 
seen in Table 7, the r-squares range from 28 to 51%, against 1% for the Central 
European countries), which goes in harmony with the fact that those countries were 
much more affected by loose of credibility and liquidity shortages during the sovereign 
debt crisis.  
 
                                                             
30 While bonds are perceived as safer assets and its markets are regulated and transparent, CDS are credit 
instruments, traded over-the-counter and thus, its markets lack transparency.   
31 It is usually assessed by subtracting the bid price from the ask price. However, for the CDS bid-ask spread I made 
the opposite calculus in order to obtain positive values. 
32
 The more buyers and sellers are competing in the market, the lower the premium will be, as few market makers 
will be able to get away with wider than normal spreads since traders can easily find a better bid (or offer) elsewhere. 
33
 Period I: Bond spread coefficients are 738, for bond bid-ask, and 2,90 for CDS bid-ask; CDS spread coefficient are 
1346 and 7,34; the r-squares are around 8% for the bond spread and 16 or 37% for the CDS spread. Period II: Bond 
spread coefficients are 1055 and 8,91; CDS spread’s are 1253 and 12; the R-squares are around 52 and 67% for the 
bond spread and 78 or 80% for the CDS’. 
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5.4. Banking Sector 
As Sgherri and Zola (2009) argued, the fiscal interventions on the banking sector that 
followed the widespread of the Subprime crisis from the US to the rest of the world 
were critical to prevent a further collapse of the Eurozone financial sector. However, 
they also brought a significant deterioration to the Eurozone budgets’ positioning, as 
governments’ debt burden came under a huge pressure. In addition, Dieckmann and 
Plank (2011), found evidence that supports a private-to-public risk transfer related to 
countries exposures to financial system during the recent economic crisis; their results 
shown that it led to a significant co-movement between the price of insurance against 
default and the performance of the financial sector. Furthermore, they found that 
different monetary authorities do have an impact and that countries using the Euro are 
more sensitive to the health of the financial system
34
. 
 Hypothesis 4: There is a strong hint that the banking sector is strongly linked to the 
distortions on the sovereign markets functioning, particularly on the Credit Default 
Swap market. Moreover, it is expected a stronger impact of the banking sector during 
the first period (if in period I banks are causing disruptions in the public debt sector, in 
period II those disruptions have already been incorporated and it is most probably the 
opposite relation that is taking place). 
As a proxy for the European financial system I use the EURO STOXX Banks (Price) 
Index
35
 (Graph 2) and introduce it in the baseline regressions (A), (B) and (C).  
The results in Tables 3, 4 and 5 support Hypothesis 4. First of all, the coefficients are 
significant and negative, evidencing the impact that an eroding financial system has in 
                                                             
34
 Inflexibility in the monetary policy and inability to print domestic currency may affect a country’s default 
probability. For this reason, Dieckmann and Plank believe that Eurozone CDS spreads may have exhibited more 
sensitivity to the health of financial system than their non-Eurozone counterparts. 
35 It is a capitalization-weighted index which includes countries that are participating in the European Monetary 
Union that are involved in the banking sector. The parent index is SXXE. The index was developed with a base value 
of 100 as of December 31, 1991. 
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widening the basis. Second, CDS spreads suffer a higher impact and the effect is 
stronger in period I (76% r-squared against 6% in period II). 
Alter and Schuler (2011) found that after the states’ support program implementation 
the sensitivity of banks’ CDS premiums towards sovereign CDS spreads has increased 
significantly (before the implementation the impact was almost null, with the exception 
of Portugal and Italy). Knowing that Euro area sovereign debt has been under a 
tremendous pressure, and allied with the above mentioned evidence of much lower 
impact of the financial sector in the sovereign basis during period II, there is room to 
suggest that the risk-transfer relationship has shifted: nowadays, there is probably a 
contagion from the government to the financial sector (for example, we have been 
observing that the recent sovereign credit rating downgrades have been culminating in 
downgrades for the major part of the domestic banking sector).  
 
5.5. ECB Key Rate 
The European Central Bank assumes responsibility for monetary policy decision-
making in the euro area since 1999 and its primary objective is to maintain price 
stability. Among the instruments that it uses to accomplish its goal, there is the official 
interest rate
36
. Since the beginning of the global crisis, the ECB has been very active in 
reducing its key rate (it went from 4,25% in July 2008 to 1% in May 2009, through 
progressive rate reductions). 
Hypothesis 5.1: If the European Central Bank has mainly a stabilizer role, then a rate 
change should mean a decrease in the basis (smoother effect). 
                                                             
36
 A change in this rate directly affects money-market interest rates and indirectly banks (lending and deposit rates). 
It also affects expectations regarding future interest rates and inflation - the goal is to anchor firmly expectations of 
price stability. In addition, it influences asset prices and exchange rates, saving and investment decisions, the supply 
of credit and the supply of bank loans (Source: European Central Bank). 
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Available in the Bloomberg terminal, there is the historical evolution of the ECB’s 
official interest rate (it can be observed in Graph 3) which was used as explanatory 
variable in regression (A). 
The stabilizer impact of the ECB can be observed by looking at results in Table 3 and 
Graph 3 at the same time: During period I, when the ECB was still increasing or 
maintaining its official rates, the coefficient has a significant negative sign (-27), which 
means that as the rate was increasing the basis was getting narrower. During period II, 
the coefficient is significant and positive (54) at the same time that the ECB official rate 
had been cut for several times, meaning that it was inducing a basis reduction.  
Moreover, as during the sovereign debt crisis (period II) other relevant factors, such as 
liquidity constraints, flight to safety or risk-free perception changes, surged stronger in 
investors’ decision matrix, the impact of the ECB rate became lower (the r-square for 
the basis goes from 14% to 2,19%).  
 
6. Conclusions 
The recent crises of the developed world led to massive repricing and risk reassessments 
of sovereign credit instruments. This work approaches the subject by studying the 
determinants of the Sovereign CDS-Bond basis’ distortions of 8 Euro area countries 
during that period. 
The first main finding shows that credit rating agencies do have a massive impact on the 
sovereign debt instruments premiums. The recent abnormal downgrades’ activity in the 
Euro area is powerful in explaining the sovereign CDS and bond spreads of the region. 
Although, as the spreads move together, the ultimate impact of credit rating and credit 
outlook changes on the basis is low.  
18 
 
Second, results confirmed the stabilization role of the European Central Bank, as its 
official rate changes proved to be partly explaining reductions in the basis. However, its 
limitations were also shown, as during the sovereign debt crisis its impact has lowered 
significantly. In fact, it has not been able to prevent countries insolvency, or investors’ 
abnormal risk aversion towards the peripherals’ debt instruments, which caused ever 
low prices on those. 
The work also supports previous studies statements on the major role of markets’ 
liquidity in causing disruptions in arbitrage-free relationships. The r-squares of the 
regressions which have the CDS and bonds’ bid-ask spreads as explanatory variables, 
are the highest of all the regressions estimated in this work.  
Finally, it seems that the risk transfer relationship between the states and the financial 
sector has shifted from one crisis period to the other. While in period I the financial 
system tension caused huge pressures on states’ financial burden, during period II the 
opposite relation appears to be taking place. However, further analysis on the banks´ 
basis behavior would clarify this thesis.  
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2007-2008 Average Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
Portugal 21,66 9,48 54,98 -3,02
Spain 22,97 8,85 59,51 7,38
France 21,27 7,46 59,85 3,62
Germany 23,25 9,01 62,68 -6,41
Italy 20,55 6,88 49,56 4,57
Belgium 20,81 7,12 49,40 6,77
Austria 26,56 7,80 51,40 17,41
Greece 24,10 8,30 44,60 13,44
2009-2011 Average Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
Portugal 40,51 88,81 202,77 -370,22
Spain 87,82 23,85 174,32 45,15
France 81,34 37,25 218,96 29,05
Germany 88,30 30,72 207,56 42,19
Italy 81,40 31,52 224,84 23,59
Belgium 65,25 36,12 181,73 -19,65
Austria 83,21 33,75 223,73 35,76
Greece 61,27 207,99 2711,30 -275,36
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7. Tables and Charts 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the basis 
The sample sub-periods go from March, 2007 to December 2008 (period I) and from 
January 2009 to October 2011 (period II). The basis is defined as CDS spread minus 
bond spread (relative to the 5y swap rate). All statistics are in basis points. Coefficients 
marked *** are significant at 1 %, ** are significant at 5 % and * are significant at 10 
%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1: 5y Bond spread, 5y CDS spread and 5y Basis, by country 
The data goes from August, 2006 to October, 2011. 
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Numerical Scale S&P Fitch Moody's
20 AAA AAA Aaa
19 AA+ AA+ Aa1
18 AA AA Aa2
17 AA- AA- Aa3
16 A+ A+ A1
15 A A A2
14 A- A- A3
13 BBB+ BBB+ Baa1
12 BBB BBB Baa2
11 BBB- BBB- Baa3
10 BB+ BB+ Ba1
9 BB BB Ba2
8 BB- BB- Ba3
7 B+ B+ B1
6 B B B2
5 B- B- B3
4 CCC+ Caa1
3 CCC Caa2
2 CCC- Caa3
1 CC Caa1
1 C Ca
DDD C
DD C
D C
CCC
SD/D0
Period I Coefficient T-stat R-squared Period II Coefficient T-stat R-squared
S&P Rating 1,21 2,54*** 0,84% S&P Rating -5,05 -5,67*** 2,72%
Fitch Rating 1,57 2,77*** 0,99% Fitch Rating -2,08 -2,06** 0,37%
Moody's Rating 2,30 3,33*** 1,43% Moody's Rating -2,45 -2,49*** 0,54%
Bond Bid_Ask 624,70 7,03*** 6,06% Bond Bid_Ask 197,33 18,95*** 23,81%
CDS Bid_Ask 4,62 -24,81*** 44,6% CDS Bid_Ask 2,65 -31,25*** 45,92%
ECB Key Rate -27,11 -10,99*** 13,63% ECB Key Rate 53,56 5,07*** 2,19%
SX7E Index -0,23 -48,97*** 75,79% SX7E Index -0,78 -8,68*** 6,15%
Other Countries Rating 0,59 0,30 0,01%
Other Countries Credit Outlook -3,25 -6,61*** 3,66%
Own Country Credit Outlook -2,02 -1,19 0,12%
Greece 
 
 
Table 2: Conversion of Rating Classifications into a Numerical Code, per Agency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of panel regressions - Basis 
The sample sub-periods go from March, 2007 to December 2008 (period I) and from January 
2009 to October 2011 (period II). The dependent variable is the group of the 8 countries’ basis. 
The basis is defined as CDS spread minus bond spread (relative to the 5y swap rate). All 
statistics are in basis points. 
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Period I Coefficient T-stat R-squared Period II Coefficient T-stat R-squared
S&P Rating -6,28 -15,04*** 22,81% S&P Rating -69,93 -35,21*** 51,87%
Fitch Rating -7,85 -15,96*** 24,95% Fitch Rating -99,44 -76,46*** 83,56%
Moody's Rating -9,53 -15,91*** 24,95% Moody's Rating -100,67 -102,75*** 83,56%
Bond Bid_Ask 738,44 8,46*** 8,55% Bond Bid_Ask 1055,77 49,15*** 67,75%
CDS Bid_Ask 2,90 12,83*** 17,7% CDS Bid_Ask 8,96 35,43*** 52,19%
ECB Key Rate -33,03 -14,02*** 20,43% ECB Key Rate 88,24 2,61*** 0,59%
SX7E Index -0,04 -4,38*** 2,45% SX7E Index -2,20 -7,64*** 4,84%
Other Countries Rating -7,48 -1,18*** 0,12%
Other Countries Credit Outlook -7,00 -4,44*** 1,69%
Own Country Credit Outlook -151,75 -50,54*** 68,96%
Period I Coefficient T-stat R-squared Period II Coefficient T-stat R-squared
S&P Rating -5,37 -8,93*** 9,42% S&P Rating -74,99 -33,92*** 50,01%
Fitch Rating -6,60 -9,20*** 9,94% Fitch Rating -101,52 -55,81*** 73,03%
Moody's Rating -7,35 -8,35*** 9,94% Moody's Rating -103,11 -66,44*** 73,03%
Bond Bid_Ask 1346,29 12,10*** 16,05% Bond Bid_Ask 1253,10 67,88*** 80,03%
CDS Bid_Ask 7,34 36,95*** 64,05% CDS Bid_Ask 11,52 56,44*** 78,48%
ECB Key Rate -58,80 -21,01*** 36,56% ECB Key Rate 141,80 3,86*** 1,28%
SX7E Index -0,26 -31,09*** 55,79% SX7E Index -2,98 -9,62*** 7,45%
Other Countries Rating -6,89 -1,00 0,09%
Other Countries Credit Outlook -10,25 -6,00*** 3,04%
Own Country Credit Outlook -153,77 -40,99*** 59,37%
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of Panel Regressions - Bond Spreads 
 The sample sub-periods go from March, 2007 to December 2008 (period I) and from January 
2009 to October 2011 (period II). The dependent variables are the 8 countries bond spreads 
(relative to the 5y swap rate).  
 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of Panel Regressions - CDS Spreads 
 The sample sub-periods go from March, 2007 to December 2008 (period I) and from January 
2009 to October 2011 (period II). The dependent variables are the 8 countries CDS spreads.  
 
 
Graph 2: Banking Sector Proxy (SX7E Index) 
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Beta Beta
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R² R²
T-stat T-stat
Beta Beta
R² R²
T-stat T-stat
Beta Beta
R² R²
T-stat T-stat
Beta Beta
R² R²
T-stat T-stat
-18,65 -8,80
4,35% 4,04%
-3,61*** -6,03***
Own Country Credit Outlook
PT+GREECE (07-08) OTHERS (07-08) PT+GREECE (09-11) OTHERS (09-11)
-6,13 -2,30
1,97% 19,98%
-2,40*** -14,67***
Other Countries Credit Outlook
PT+GREECE (07-08) OTHERS (07-08) PT+GREECE (09-11) OTHERS (09-11)
9,77 -0,40
0,36% 0,04%
1,01 -0,58
Other Countries Rating
PT+GREECE (07-08) OTHERS (07-08) PT+GREECE (09-11) OTHERS (09-11)
64,39% 80,15% 5,63% 32,47%
-18,53*** -48,18* -4,13*** -20,36***
OTHERS (07-08) PT+GREECE (09-11) OTHERS (09-11)
-0,19 -0,24 -1,42 -0,57
-1,95* -11,65*** 2,45*** 10,50***
SX7E Index
-9,14 -33,10 98,50 38,57
1,96% 19,13% 2,05% 11,34%
ECB Key Rate
PT+GREECE (07-08) OTHERS (07-08) PT+GREECE (09-11) OTHERS (09-11)
29,52% 55,11% 62,71% 2,81%
8,92*** 25,55*** 21,93*** 4,99***
PT+GREECE (07-08) OTHERS (07-08) PT+GREECE (09-11) OTHERS (09-11)
2,73 5,82 3,09 1,86
6,57*** 5,15*** 13,18*** 4,35***
CDS Bid_Ask
1258,19 516,14 254,84 264,30
18,52% 4,42% 37,80% 2,15%
Bond Bid_Ask
PT+GREECE (07-08) OTHERS (07-08) PT+GREECE (09-11) OTHERS (09-11)
1,19% 1,04% 8,17% 0,07%
1,52* 2,46*** -5,04*** 0,79
PT+GREECE (07-08) OTHERS (07-08) PT+GREECE (09-11) OTHERS (09-11)
2,55 3,61 -13,55 1,14
1,52* 1,30* -5,09*** 1,05
Moody's Rating
1,70 1,37 -14,93 1,16
1,19% 0,29% 8,31% 0,13%
Fitch Rating
PT+GREECE (07-08) OTHERS (07-08) PT+GREECE (09-11) OTHERS (09-11)
0,01%
-0,90 1,86* -8,87*** -0,35
S&P Rating
PT+GREECE (07-08) OTHERS (07-08) PT+GREECE (09-11) OTHERS (09-11)
-1,76 1,43 -22,02 -0,29
0,42% 0,60% 21,56%
Graph 3: European Central Bank Official Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of panel regressions (Portugal, Greece Vs. Others) 
 The sample sub-periods are from March, 2007 to December 2008 (period I) and from January 
2009 to October 2011 (period II). The dependent variables are Portuguese and Greek basis on 
one side and the remaining countries’ on the other. The basis is defined as CDS spread minus 
bond spread (relative to the 5y swap rate). All statistics are in basis points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Beta Beta
R² R²
T-stat T-stat
PIGS (07-08)
Beta Beta
R² R²
T-stat T-stat
Beta Beta
R² R²
T-stat T-stat
Beta Beta
R² R²
T-stat T-stat
Beta Beta
R² R²
T-stat T-stat
-5,77 -14,65
0,73% 2,56%
-2,05** -3,88***
Own Country Credit Outlook
PIGS (07-08) CENTRAL'S (07-08) PIGS (09-11) CENTRAL'S (09-11)
-3,75 -2,69
2,13% 24,48%
-3,53*** -13,64***
Other Countries Credit Outlook
PIGS (07-08) CENTRAL'S (07-08) PIGS (09-11) CENTRAL'S (09-11)
4,13 -1,76
0,17% 0,66%
0,99 -1,95**
Other Countries Rating
PIGS (07-08) CENTRAL'S (07-08) PIGS (09-11) CENTRAL'S (09-11)
-32,73*** -36,67*** -4,98*** -19,75***
-0,23 -0,23 -0,88 -0,69
73,71% 77,90% 4,15% 40,46%
SX7E Index
CENTRAL'S (07-08) PIGS (09-11) CENTRAL'S (09-11)
14,52%
-5,94*** -9,76*** 2,92*** 9,87***
15,55*** 20,91*** 25,12*** 2,67***
ECB Key Rate
PIGS (07-08) CENTRAL'S (07-08) PIGS (09-11) CENTRAL'S (09-11)
-21,19 -33,03 60,03 47,08
8,45% 19,95% 1,47%
3,91 5,69 2,79 1,47
39,14% 53,37% 52,11% 1,23%
CDS Bid_Ask
PIGS (07-08) CENTRAL'S (07-08) PIGS (09-11) CENTRAL'S (09-11)
8,37% 5,80% 28,38% 1,39%
5,91*** 4,85*** 15,08*** 2,85***
PIGS (07-08) CENTRAL'S (07-08) PIGS (09-11) CENTRAL'S (09-11)
1062,59 501,38 214,10 236,30
3,52*** 2,61*** -3,39*** 6,07***
Bond Bid_Ask
3,26 8,06 -5,33 21,22
3,15% 1,75% 1,96% 6,03%
Moody's Rating
PIGS (07-08) CENTRAL'S (07-08) PIGS (09-11) CENTRAL'S (09-11)
2,78% 1,75% 2,00% 6,03%
3,30*** 2,61*** -3,43*** 6,07***
PIGS (07-08) CENTRAL'S (07-08) PIGS (09-11) CENTRAL'S (09-11)
2,93 8,06 -5,91 21,22
2,87*** 2,61*** -7,34*** 6,07***
Fitch Rating
1,99 8,06 -11,40 21,22
2,11% 1,75% 8,57% 6,03%
S&P Rating
PIGS (07-08) CENTRAL'S (07-08) PIGS (09-11) CENTRAL'S (09-11)
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of panel regressions (Southern Vs. Central countries) 
 The sample sub-periods are from March, 2007 to December 2008 (period I) and from January 
2009 to October 2011 (period II). The dependent variables are Portuguese, Greek, Spanish and 
Italian basis on one side and the remaining countries’ on the other. The basis is defined as CDS 
spread minus bond spread (relative to the 5y swap rate). All statistics are in basis points. 
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Appendix 1 -The Crisis, Macro View 
 
The 2007-2008 crisis started in the US with the collapse of the subprime mortgage 
market in early 2007, at the same time that the real estate bubble, that had been around 
for the previous two years, went bust. Both subprime lending and one-way-only house 
prices were a consequence of a prolonged period of low interest rates and major 
relaxations on bank’s lending standards. If the first made the credit market seem more 
accessible and attractive, the second allowed that indeed it became accessible to 
everyone, even to those who under normal risk standards would not be eligible to 
contract a loan. In the end, the belief that housing prices could only go one way, and 
that way was up, supported all that easiness in lending – in case of default by the 
borrower, the bank would be the new owner of a valuable asset that was always getting 
more valuable.  
The default on a significant amount of subprime mortgages, allied with the end of the 
housing boom, caused a spillover effect from the US to the rest of the world. Balance 
sheets of major financial institutions (actually those were OTC products, off-balance 
sheet, which only made harder to understand the proportion of the defaults’ damages) 
around the globe were full of securitized products, attached to those subprime 
mortgages.  
The uncertainty about the dimension and value of securities collateralized by these 
subprime mortgages, spread uncertainty and banks stopped lending to each other. 
 The crisis eroded further when in March 2008, Bear Stearns, whose exposure to 
counterparties was considered too extensive and risky, had to be bought by J.P. Morgan, 
backstopped with funds from the Federal Reserve. The last minute bailout went on with 
28 
 
J.P. Morgan acquiring by $2 a share one of the world’s largest and most storied 
investment banks. A year before, Bear Stearns shares were selling for $170 each.  
The events got worse when on the on the 15
th
 of September 2008, Lehman Brothers, 
holder of $600 billion in assets, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. It remains 
the largest bankruptcy filing in the U.S. history. The Fed allowed for this major 
bankruptcy in order to avoid feeding the belief that all insolvent institutions would be 
rescued – it fought moral hazard. It also claimed that Lehman was in a worse financial 
shape and less exposed to counterparty risk than Bear Stearns was. However, the next 
day, AIG (the world’s biggest insurance company) had to be nationalized on the basis of 
fears of the systemic consequences that could result from the collateralized default 
swaps they had been underwriting in the past few years – moral hazard was no longer 
the issue. 
The Lehman’s bankruptcy resulted in the seizing up of interbank lending, on panic that 
no bank was safe anymore. In early October, the results were spread to Europe and the 
Emerging countries and the world witnessed a large-scale state support for banks. The 
states’ fiscal deficit got back to values last seen after the World War II, inflated not only 
by the state interventions in the banking sector but also due to a generalized increase in 
public spending targeted at softening the impact of the reduction of private spending on 
the economy. 
Therefore, in the first half of 2010, the euro zone sovereign debt markets were under an 
unprecedented stress and massive sell-offs of the so-called peripheral economies 
government bonds took place, while a flight to safety phenomenon occurred.  
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Under the Stability and Growth Pact
37
 Government Debt of the European Union 
members is limited to 60% of GDP. However, according to the Central Intelligence 
Agency World Fact Book the predictions for 2010’s public debt levels revealed 142,7% 
Government Debt to GDP ratio for Greece (4
th
 highest public debt to GDP in the 
World), 119% for Italy, 93% for Portugal, 100,7% for Belgium, 72,3% for Austria and 
62,7% for the Netherlands. Not even Germany (83,4%) or France (82,4%) met the Pact 
requirements and only Spain followed the limit, with a ratio of 60,1%. 
Eventually, some of the peripheral economies started having difficulties to re-finance 
their debt at the same time that were facing historical high yields (since the euro’s 
establishment) every time they were issuing new debt. Consequently to all these, on the 
2
nd
 of May, 2010, Eurozone members, together with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) had to help Greece on preventing default on its massive debt. The rescue package 
included €80bn from the EU and €30bn from the IMF, on exchange for severe austerity 
measures to the Hellenic economy.   
This was the first of three sovereign bailouts. After Greece, Ireland asked for external 
help in the following November, 21
st
. The rescue package included €67,5 billion in 
loans from the EU and the IMF.  
Finally, Portugal asked for external help in April 2011. Facing increasingly higher 
interest rates and rating downgrades, the country surrendered to the €78bn, 3 year loan, 
package that included €12bn to support the banking sector, on compromise that the 
2011’s deficit would be reduced to 5,9% (from 9,1%) of GDP. Public sector wages 
would have to be frozen, job promotions limited and new public investment suspended. 
Furthermore, among other measures, Government stakes in national companies needed 
to be privatized. 
                                                             
37
 The Stability and Growth Pact is a framework for coordinating fiscal policy between the EU Member States - 
includes a set of rules for fiscal policies in the Member States, including limits on government deficits and debt to 
ensure sound public finances. It is an important element of Economic and Monetary Union. 
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The once perceived risk-free government debt instruments ceased to be so – Portugal’s 
2 year Government Bond moved from a 2,5% yield in 2004 to 17% on September, 
2011; Greece saw its 1 year Government Bonds’ yields surge to as abnormal values as 
133%. At the same time, CDS Spreads reached the four digits numbers of 3.000 to 
4.000 basis points, from around 9 to 20 basis points in 2006.  
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Appendix 2 – The CDS-Bond Basis 
 
The CDS-Bond Basis comes in as an interesting instrument through which one can 
observe the abnormal sovereign’s markets functioning. Nonetheless, being a useful 
instrument to help making inferences on the debt market’s health, it can also be a 
potential source of profit, when it acquires abnormal values as it has been happening 
during the crises. 
The basis is the difference between the spread of a CDS and the spread of a fixed-rate 
bond, for the same underlying issuer and with similar maturity. 
CDS stands for Credit Default Swap, and is essentially an over-the-counter insurance 
contract that offers protection against default of a specific reference entity
38
. The 
protection buyer makes periodic premium payments to the protection seller until 
maturity or until some credit event occurs
39
. If and when a credit event occurs, the 
protection buyer delivers a bond, from a pool of eligible bonds to the protection seller, 
in exchange for its par value – physical settlement, as explained by Jan De Wit (2006) - 
or, less commonly, a cash settlement is established where the protection seller pays the 
difference between the bond’s recovery value and its par.  
The premium paid by the protection buyer to the protection seller, called the “spread”, is 
quoted in basis points per annum of the contract’s notional value and is usually paid 
quarterly.  
Differently from the CDS, which spreads are directly observed, bond spreads are a more 
complex issue. Traditionally, yield spreads were calculated using a risk-free sovereign 
                                                             
38 Reference Entity is essentially the party upon which the two counterparties in the transaction are speculating. The 
seller of the transaction is selling protection against the default of the reference entity. The buyer of the securitized 
credit derivative believes that there may be a chance that the reference entity will default upon their issued debt and is 
therefore entering the appropriate position. It can be a corporation, government or other legal entity that issues debt of 
any kind. 
39 A recent document published by ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association) on Greek Sovereign 
Debt (31-10-2011) refers as credit events the following: Failure to Pay Principal or the Coupon when they are due; 
Repudiation/Moratorium and Restructuring. 
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bond as benchmark, which in this case would be the German bunds. However, besides 
the inconvenient of letting Germany outside the sample, in the literature it is becoming 
widespread the conviction that swap rates are the most adequate benchmark to compute 
this variable. Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009) support the arguments of McCauley 
(2002); Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) and Blanco,Brennan, and Marsh (2005). 
Together they argue that government bonds are less than an ideal proxy for the 
unobservable risk-free rate because of different taxation treatment, repo specials, and 
scarcity premiums. Moreover, the Euro-swap benchmark comes with the advantages of 
being highly liquid and carrying relatively lower counterparty risk. Fontana and 
Scheicher add that the benchmark role of Bunds may lead to the existence of a 
significant convenience yield
40
. On the other hand, this method can slightly increase the 
basis, as IRS are normally higher than German yields.  
Under normal market conditions and for no-arbitrage theory to hold, the basis should be 
zero (Fontana and Scheicher, 2010 and Jan de Wit, 2006) because both Sovereign bonds 
and CDS offer exposure to the same sovereign debt and thus, buy a bond or sell 
protection on it should carry the same risk. Historically, however, the basis has been 
slightly above zero, meaning that CDS spreads have consistently overcome bonds’ 
spreads. This evidence is justified by Fontana and Scheicher, who state that bonds are 
cash instruments and CDS are derivative contracts and, as a result, from a trader’s 
perspective, those are not perfect substitutes. Bond prices are affected by interest rate 
risk, default risk, funding risk and market liquidity risk, while CDS are affected mainly 
by default risk and counterparty risk.  
                                                             
40 Reference Entity is essentially the party upon which the two counterparties in the transaction are speculating. The 
seller of the transaction is selling protection against the default of the reference entity. The buyer of the securitized 
credit derivative believes that there may be a chance that the reference entity will default upon their issued debt and is 
therefore entering the appropriate position. It can be a corporation, government or other legal entity that issues debt of 
any kind. 
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As the spreads’ difference diverges from zero, there should be at least a theoretical 
arbitrage opportunity. Some authors have defended that those arbitrage opportunities 
which surged during the crisis, do not seem to be exploitable, due to market frictions 
and structural changes
41
.   
When the opportunity is exploitable and the basis is positive, the arbitrage strategy on 
this deviation would consist on short-selling the bond, underwriting CDS protection, 
while buying the risk-free rate. Palladini and Portes (2011) explain that the rationale 
behind this trading has to do with the fact that if the credit quality on the reference 
entity improves (and the basis gets narrow) no reimbursement will occur, while the 
CDS seller profits from the stream of premium payments. 
On the other hand, if the basis is negative, the strategy would be the opposite: buying 
the bond and protection against its default, financed at the risk-free rate. In this case, the 
rationale is betting that the basis will increase, or that the credit quality of the reference 
entity will get worse. If a credit event occurs the buyer will receive the compensation, 
but, even if it doesn’t get to the point of default, CDS owned by the buyer will have a 
higher value, as the probability of default of the reference entity has eroded. Thus, the 
investor can still sell it on the market for a profit, assuming that the market would have 
enough liquidity to absorb it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
41
 For instance, in 2008, short-selling exacerbated by naked short-selling41, was seen as a major contributor for the 
high market volatility that was verified. As a consequence, this investment strategy was prohibited by the US 
Securities and Exchange Comission (SEC) for a total of 799 financial companies, during a period of three weeks. The 
United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA) did the same for a smaller range of 32 financial companies. 
Australia authorities went even further, by prohibiting short-selling in its totality. 
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Appendix 3 – Near Multicollinearity 
 
According to Chris Brooks in Introductory Econometrics for Finance (2008), near 
multicollinearity occurs when there is a non-negligible relationship between two or 
more explanatory variables, which causes distortions in the outcome of the regression. 
One of the problems that it comprises is the r-squares being high but the individual 
coefficients having high standard errors so that the regression will appear to be good as 
a whole, but the individual coefficients will not be significant. In addition, the 
regression becomes very sensitive to small changes in the specifications, so that adding 
or removing an explanatory variable leads to changes in the coefficient values or 
significances of the other variables. 
The presence of near multicollinearity can be detected by observing variables’ 
correlation with each other, as a high correlation means potential presence of 
multicollinearity. By observing Table 8.1 and 8.2 it becomes clear the presence of this 
distortive effect.  
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2009-2011 S&P Rating Fitch Rating Moody's Rating Bond Bid_Ask CDS Bid_Ask ECB Key Rate SX7E Index Others' Rating Others' Outlook Own Outlook
S&P Rating 100,00%
Fitch Rating 83,44% 100,00%
Moody's Rating 81,55% 96,80% 100,00%
Bond Bid_Ask -49,19% -69,82% -74,16% 100,00%
CDS Bid_Ask 50,27% 62,02% 65,27% -88,98% 100,00%
ECB Key Rate 1,95% -4,70% -6,10% 13,67% -15,53% 100,00%
SX7E Index 2,34% 11,89% 15,63% -23,66% 24,14% -70,22% 100,00%
Others' Rating -5,12% -2,00% 0,47% -2,87% -0,06% -1,90% 9,12% 100,00%
Others' Outlook -9,20% -0,31% 4,91% -15,29% 9,70% 12,60% 22,01% 25,80% 100,00%
Own Outlook 65,00% 78,92% 80,04% -61,12% 52,18% 2,58% 10,99% 2,89% 14,87% 100,00%
2007-2008 S&P Rating Fitch Rating Moody's Rating Bond Bid_Ask CDS Bid_Ask ECB Key Rate SX7E Index
S&P Rating 100,00%
Fitch Rating 93,95% 100,00%
Moody's Rating 95,92% 96,74% 100,00%
Bond Bid_Ask -14,85% -15,51% -12,90% 100,00%
CDS Bid_Ask -8,46% -5,46% -2,09% -14,48% 100,00%
ECB Key Rate 0,37% -0,04% -0,09% -14,81% 61,35% 100,00%
SX7E Index 2,57% 0,03% 0,07% -37,27% 59,24% 41,12% 100,00%
Table 8.1 and 8.2: Correlation between explanatory variables 
The sample sub-periods are from March, 2007 to December 2008 (period I) and from January 
2009 to October 2011 (period II). 
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Appendix 4 – Rating Agencies 
Standard & Poor’s 
Standard & Poor’s is a United States-based financial services company. It has offices in 
23 countries and a history that dates back more than 150 years. It is known to investors 
worldwide as a leader in financial markets’ intelligence. As a Credit Rating Agency, the 
company publishes credit ratings for the debt of public and private corporations and 
states. It issues both short and long term credit ratings. 
Moody’s 
Moody’s Investors Service, whose parent’s company is Moody’s Corporation 
(headquarters in New York City), is a leading provider of credit rating, research and risk 
analysis. The firm’s ratings and analysis track debt covering more than 110 countries, 
12.000 corporate issuers, 25.000 public finance issuers, and 106.000 structured finance 
obligations.   
Fitch 
Fitch Ratings, part of the Fitch Group, is dual-headquartered in New York and London 
and was founded in 1913. It comprises 51 offices worldwide and positions itself as a 
global rating agency dedicated to providing value beyond every opinion.  
 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Services and Fitch Ratings are the Big Three 
credit rating agencies that dominate 90% of the world market for ratings of governments 
and companies. They are the only agencies recognized by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission as nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, since 1975. Also 
in the European Union the ratings issued by these three institutions have been used as 
legal benchmarks in investment and lending rule for banks, insurances, many 
investment funds and other institutional investors.  
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Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term
Aaa AAA AAA Prime
Aa1 AA+ AA+
Aa2 AA AA
Aa3 AA- AA-
A1 A+ A+
A2 A A
A3 A- A-
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+
Baa2 BBB BBB
Baa3 BBB- BBB-
Ba1 BB+ BB+
Ba2 BB BB
Ba3 BB- BB-
B1 B+ B+
B2 B B
B3 B- B-
Caa1 CCC+ Substancial risks
Caa2 CCC Extremely speculative
Caa3 CCC-
CC
C
C DDD
- DD
- D
-
High grade
Upper medium grade
Lower medium grade
Non-investment grade speculative
Highly speculative
In default with little prospect for recovery
In default 
CCC
F1+
F1
F2
F3
B
C
Not prime
Ca
D
A-1+
A-1
A-2
A-3
B
C
-
Moody's S&P Fitch
P-1
P-2
P-3
 
Table 9: Credit Rating Classifications and their meaning 
Long-term and Short-term credit rating classifications, per agency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 Appendix 5 - Credit Rating, a step further 
 
Besides being able to capture all the significant rating activity that has been going on in 
the markets, by using the information of all the three agencies it is also possible to 
assess if there is a stronger impact on the basis when there is more than one agency’s 
credit rating change. 
Hypothesis 1.3: If agencies move in tandem, then the impact on the basis should be 
higher. Moreover, by bringing a definitive impact to the market, the last change should 
be stronger. 
This hypothesis was assessed through the hypothesis test method. This analysis focuses 
on the credit rating changing days, in order to provide more detailed conclusions. I 
tested the null hypothesis of the average impact of a rating change not impacting the 
basis (or the null hypothesis of the average impact to be equal to zero) against the 
alternative hypothesis of that average being different from zero, as shown below: 
                                       
                                                      
 
  
                 
 
  
 
The average basis changes are measured during the period that goes from 7 days before 
to 1 one day after the day of the credit rating change. To assess the basis behavior 
during periods of more increased rating changes activity I picked-up the events that 
were followed or preceded by other rating announcement(s) in short periods of time that 
can go from 0 to 12 days. As expected, the impact of 2 or more rating changes in the 
countries’ basis is significant (on the contrary, through this method, isolated rating 
changes did not prove to impact significantly on the basis) - the test statistic (z) 
39 
 
compares with the critical value 2,09 (t-student) and overcomes it (Image 1) - probably, 
a reinforcement of the credit quality depreciation causes a higher erosion in the CDS 
market. Finally, the first change occurring in that short period of time has a significant 
impact on the basis, while the last change does not (Image 1). It seems that the first is 
bringing in the information, whereas the last arrives when the basis has already 
incorporated the potential severity of markets conditions during that period. So, the 
effect of new information is stronger than the reinforcement effect, refuting, in part, 
hypothesis 1.3. 
 
Image 1: Hypothesis testing – More than one credit rating downgrade 
The impact on the basis is calculated by computing the difference between 7 days 
earlier and one day after the announcement. The periods that comprise more than one 
downgrade range between 0 and 12 days. 
The test statistic has to be compared with the T-Student distribution’s critical values 
whenever the number of observations (i.e. credit rating changes) is less than 30. 
Otherwise it is compared with the Normal distribution’s critical values. 
 
 
 
Average 148,4
Std. Dev 217,8
N 20,0
Z 3,0 > 2,09 (t-student), statistically significant
Average 154,4
Std. Dev 237,9
N 9,0
Z 1,9 < 2,26 (t-student), not significant
Average 182,2
Std. Dev 215,1
N 9,0
Z 2,5 > 2,26 (t-student), statistically significant
More than one
Last downgrade
First downgrade
